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INTENTIONAL INJURY
During an old-timer's softball game, "Bug" Schilling was caught
in a run down between second and third base. While making the tag,
the third baseman, William Breland, narrowly escaped collision with the
aggressive base runner. While Schilling lay prone after his slide into
third base, Breland "either dropped, tossed, or threw the softball" in
his direction, striking Schilling on the chin. After an exchange of words,
Schilling shattered Breland's jaw with a single punch. Schilling had
personal liability coverage under a homeowner's policy that excluded
coverage. for. "bodily injury or property damage which is either expected
or intended from the standpoint of the insured." The insurer denied
coverage for Breland's claim. In response to interrogatories, the trial
jury found that Schilling did not intend the bodily injury to Breland.'
In affirming the judgment against the insurer, the Louisiana Supreme
Court in Breland v. Schilling2 applied a new subjective standard in
determining whether the common policy exclusion for intentional injury
was applicable.
In an earlier decision, Pique v. Saia,3 the court construed the pro-
vision to exclude only intentional injury. Borrowing the standard for
an intentional act developed in Bazley v. Tortorich,4 the court defined
an intentional injury as the product of an intentional act. Bazley involved
Copyright 1990, by LOUISIANA LAw REvIEw
Adjunct Professors of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. The jury also apportioned fault between the parties, assigning 75% to Schilling
and 25% to Breland.
2. 550 So. 2d 609 (La. 1989).
3. 450 So. 2d 654 (La. 1984).
4. 397 So. 2d 475 (La. 1981). In Pique, the court defined an intentional injury as
follows:
An injury is intentional, i.e., the product of an intentional act, only when the
person who acts either consciously desires the physical result of his act, whatever
the likelihood of that result happening from his conduct; or knows that that
result is substantially certain to follow from his conduct, whatever his desire
may be as to the result.
450 So. 2d at 655.
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interpreting the phrase "an intentional act" within the meaning of
workers' compensation law. 5
Without discussing its earlier decision in Pique, the Breland court
found that the policy language "emphasizes that an excluded injury is
one which the insured intended, not one that the insured caused, however
intentional the injury-producing act . . .," so that "[t]he subjective
intention and expectation of the insured determine which injuries fall
within and which fall beyond the scope of coverage under this policy." 6
The court expressly found the objective tort standard set forth in Bazley
inapplicable 7 and suggested that an insurance purchaser would not rea-
sonably expect coverage for an injury that he intended, whether slight
or grave, but that the purchaser would expect to be protected from
unexpected serious injury when only minor injury was intended. The
court then articulated the following standards for application of the
intentional injury exclusion:
We hold, therefore, that when minor injury is intended, and
such results, the injury is barred from coverage. When serious
injury is intended, and such results, the injury is also barred
from coverage. When a severe injury of a given sort is intended,
and a severe injury of any sort occurs, then coverage is also
barred. But when minor injury is intended, and a substantially
greater or more severe injury results, whether by chance, co-
incidence, accident, or whatever, coverage for the more severe
injury is not barred. Whether a given resulting bodily injury
was intended from the standpoint of the insured within these
parameters is a question of fact. Such factual determinations
are the particular province of the trier of fact, in this instance
the trial jury.'
The court affirmed the judgment upon finding that the record sup-
ported the jury's conclusion that the defendant did not have the requisite
subjective intent to injure the plaintiff.9
The subjective standard enunciated by the Breland court for deter-
mining whether an intentional act is covered by a policy cannot be easily
5. Under La. R.S. 22:1032 (1982), the exclusive remedy provisions of the workers'
compensation act do not apply to liability "resulting from an intentional act."
6. 550 So. 2d at 611.
7. Id. It also distinguished Caudle v. Betts, 512 So. 2d 389 (La. 1987), which held
that an electrical shock administered as a practical joke was an "intentional act" within
the meaning of the workers' compensation act even though the actor had not intended
any physical injury.
8. 550 So. 2d 609, 614 (La. 1989).
9. Id. The court referred to the defendant's testimony that he was just trying to
protect himself, that he didn't intend to break the plaintiff's jaw or do him any serious
harm, and that the broken jaw was just a "freak accident."
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applied by the courts. The court's subjective standard invites the "I
didn't mean to do it" defense and will be more difficult to apply than
an objective standard. Judges and juries probably will disregard such a
defense uttered from the lips of an insured who wielded a deadly weapon.
It will be more difficult, however, to evaluate the subjective intent of
a brawl participant who, after the anger has cooled, will contritely plead
he did not intend the injury actually inflicted. This question, then,
becomes whether Breland will permit insurance coverage only for the
truly unusual and unexpected injury.
In Menard v. Zeno, 0 the first case to apply Breland, the third circuit
deemed that the intentional injury exclusion precluded coverage for the
insured's homosexual rape of an eight year old boy. Specifically, the
court found the psychological injuries suffered by the boy were "con-
sistent with the clinical picture of a child sexually abused, as opposed
to the 'freak' and unintended injuries suffered in Breland.""
In Jones v. Thomas, 2 the supreme court had held that an employer
may be vicariously liable for the intentional act of an employee which
injures a co-employee. In a sequel to that decision, the fourth circuit
held that the employer's liability was not covered under its comprehensive
general liability policy because that policy excluded coverage for "bodily
injury to an employee of the insured arising out of and in the course
of his employment by the insured."' 3 Coverage for an employer's liability
to his own employees is generally provided under a Workers' Compen-
sation/Employer's Liability Policy.
PRIMARY AND EXCESS INSURERS
In Great Southwest Fire Insurance Company v. CNA Insurance
Companies,14 the court established rules governing the relationship be-
tween primary and excess liability insurers. A substantial difference of
opinion exists in recent Louisiana state and federal court decisions
concerning whether a primary insurer owes any duties to an excess
insurer." In Great Southwest, the issue arose out of a personal injury
10. 558 So. 2d 744 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 561 So. 2d 121 (1990).
11. Id. at 748. In Williamson v. Historic Hurtsville Ass'n, 556 So. 2d 103 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1990), without reference to Breland, the fourth circuit reversed a summary
judgment in favor of a homeowner's insurer, suggesting that injuries resulting from the
insured's allegedly defamatory statement may not have been intentional.
12. 426 So. 2d 609 (La. 1983).
13. Jones v. Thomas, 557 So. 2d 1015 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990).
14. 557 So. 2d 966 (La. 1990).
15. Cf. Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. CNA Ins. Co., 711 F. Supp. 310 (W.D. La.
1988), rev'd 904 F. 2d 703 (5th Cir. 1990); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. United General
Ins. Co., 664 F. Supp. 1022 (W.D. La. 1987); and Laper v. Board of Comm'rs of Port
of New Orleans, 523 So. 2d 926 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 531 So. 2d 275 (1988)
1990]
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claim against Contract Cleaners, whose primary liability insurer was
Transportation Insurance Company and whose excess insurer was Great
Southwest. Transportation's unsuccessful defense of Contract Cleaners
resulted in a judgment in the principal sum of $396,000. Transportation
paid its primary policy limits of $300,000, and Great Southwest was
responsible for the remainder. Great Southwest sought to recover its
expenditures from Transportation on the ground that its loss resulted
from Transportation's bad faith failure to settle within the policy limits
and to properly defend the interests of the insured. Great Southwest
contended that it was entitled to recover from Transportation both in
its own right and as the insured's subrogee.
The court held that a primary carrier does not owe a duty to the
excess carrier in the defense and settlement of claims against their
common insured. The court concluded that it was unsound to create a
delictual duty of care or good faith performance owed by the primary
insurer to the excess insurer. 6 The court did, however, indicate that an
excess insurer may become conventionally or legally, subrogated to the
insured's rights against the primary insurer under certain circumstances.
If the primary insurer breaches duties owed to the insured, the primary
insurer may become solidarily liable with the excess insurer for the
portion of the judgment in excess of the primary policy limits. Upon
satisfaction of that solidary obligation, the excess insurer would be
subrogated to the insured's rights against the other solidary obligor, the
primary insurer.
After establishing that the excess insurer may be subrogated to the
insured's rights where the primary and excess insurer have been solidary
obligors, the court described how the obligation should be apportioned
between the two solidary obligors. When the primary insurer's bad faith
failure to perform caused' the excess judgment, the court concluded that
the primary insurer should be considered the principal obligor and thus
liable to the excess insurer for reimbursement of the whole debt.
Because the court considered only the primary insurer's exception
to the excess insurer's suit, the court did not determine whether the
with National Union Fire Ins. v. Liberty Mutual Ins., 696 F. Supp. 1099 (E.D. La. 1988);
Insurance Co. of North America v. Home Ins. Co., 644 F. Supp. 359 (E.D. La. 1986)
and Southern America Ins. v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 498 So. 2d 280 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1986), writ denied, 500 So. 2d 425 (1987).
16. In a companion case, Gibbs v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 557 So. 2d 972 (La.
1990), the court answered in the negative the following question certified from the United
States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals: "Does the primary insurer owe a duty to the excess
insurer similar to the duty it owes to its insured, to act reasonably and in good faith?"
In Great Southwest, 557 So. 2d at 971, the majority opinion concluded with the observation
that, "[i]n a proper case, it may be possible for the excess carrier to recover directly
from the primary insurer for damage caused by an abuse of right." Without further
explanation, the court noted that such theory would require pleading and proof of factors
not alleged in this action.
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primary insurer actually breached any duty owed to the insured that
would render the primary insurer solidarily liable with the excess insurer
for the amount of the judgment in excess of the primary limits. Great
Southwest, however, does establish the ground rule that future claims
by excess insurers must be based upon their subrogation to the insured's
rights against the primary insurer because no duty is owed by the primary
insurer directly to the excess insurer.
PENALTY STATUTES
In both the 1989 and 1990 legislative sessions, considerable interest
was taken in regulating the handling and payment of claims by insurers.
In 1989, the legislature amended the general penalty statute, Louisiana
Revised Statutes 22:658, to reduce the payment period from 60 to 30
days, to add duties to pay claims of third parties for property damage
and medical expenses within 30 days of written settlemerit and to com-
pensate third parties for loss of use of personal vehicles.' 7 The legislature
also amended the Unfair Trade Practices Act to define and sanction
"unfair claims settlement practices" by insurers. s
Activity in the insurance claims area continued in 1990 with the
enactment of Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:1220 which provides that
an insurer "owes to his insured a duty of good faith and fair dealing"
and has "an affirmative duty to adjust claims fairly and promptly and
to make a reasonable effort to Settle claims with the insured or claimant,
or both."' 9 The statute defines five acts which, if knowingly committed,
constitute a breach of these duties, 'including (1) misrepresenting facts
or policy provisions, (2) failing to pay a written settlement within 30
days, (3) denying coverage based on an application altered without the
insured's knowledge, (4) misleading a claimant as to the applicable
prescriptive period or (5) failing to pay an insured, without probable
cause, within 60 days after receipt of satisfactory proof of loss. In
addition to any general or special damages resulting from such breach,
the claimant may be awarded penalties not to exceed two times the
damages sustained or $5,000, whichever is greater. 20
The legislature's patchwork approach to solving perceived problems
with the handling of claims by insurance companies aggravates and
17. .1989 La. Acts No. 638, § 1.
18. La. R.S. 22:1214, :1217 (1982) as amended by 1989 La. Acts No. 638, § 1.
19. 1990 La. Acts No. 308, § 1.
20. Also, La. R.S. 22:658 (1978) was amended by 1990 La. Acts Nos. 262, § 1 and
955, § 1. Act 262 was a technical amendment to clarify that the 30 day payment period
was triggered by either satisfactory proof of loss -or written settlement agreement. Act
955 added a provision for penalties and attorneys fees, for the failure to pay, without
probable cause, for alternative transportation.
1990]
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illustrates the need for comprehensive revision of the Insurance Code.
Because the last comprehensive revision of the Insurance Code occurred
in 1958, many areas of the Insurance Code have been plastered with a
confusing array of legislative bandaids. As a result, the entire Code
needs careful and coordinated study and treatment.
DIRECT ACTION STATUTE
Two interesting decisions occurred during this term involving the
Direct Action Statute, Louisiana Revised Statutes 22:655. The Louisiana
Supreme Court decision in Quinlan v. Liberty Bank and Trust Com-
pany,2' superficially straightforward and unremarkable, prompted an
unusually vigorous dissent which bears examination. In that case, plain-
tiffs asserted a right of direct action against an insurer who had issued
a "directors' and officers' liability policy" because a bank officer insured
under the policy allegedly was negligent in managing their funds. Despite
its name, the policy contained a number of provisions, which were
arguably inconsistent with the usual liability policy. The policy language
appeared to disavow any defense obligation and considered the costs of
defense a part of the liability limits rather than expenses beyond the
stated liability limits. Both the trial court and the court of appeal22
determined that the policy was simply an indemnity policy thereby
indicating that the insurer was not subject to a direct action by third-
party claimants such as the plaintiffs.
In a very brief opinion, the supreme court reversed the lower court's
decision; however, two justices joined in a lengthy and vigorous dissent
in which the history surrounding Louisiana's Direct Action Statute is
discussed. Both the majority and the dissenting opinion contain valid
points and are not necessarily in conflict with one another.
The main theme of the dissent is that the insurance contract by its
provisions (as opposed to its "caption," to which the majority opinion
made reference) clearly envisioned an "indemnity" obligation as opposed
to a "liability" obligation. That the insurer intended the policy to be
an indemnity policy rather than a liability policy seems reasonably clear,
and to that extent the dissenting justices are correct; however a second
and ultimately more crucial question is whether the public policy un-
derlying the Direct Action Statute will permit the terms of the policy
to prevail in this instance.
21. 558 So. 2d 221 (La. 1990).
22. Quinian v. Liberty Bank and Trust Company, 545 So. 2d 1140 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), writ granted, 550 So. 2d 637 (1989), and rev'd by 558 So. 2d 221 (1990).
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Throughout the history of the Direct Action Statute courts have
invalidated policy provisions13 that purport to limit an insured's recourse
against an insurance company because of the fact of the statutory
provisions. Assertions that the insurance policy demands that no direct
action may be had against the insurer proved to be an insufficient
argument to defeat an action authorized by the Direct Action Statute.
Thus, the dissenters' analysis of the policy provisions, while certainly
proper and arguably correct, does not resolve the ultimate question of
whether a direct action against the insurer, in fact, exists. Although a
policy may imply that no right of direct action exists, the policy, itself,
may not comply with the terms of the statute, and therefore may be
invalid.
Unfortunately, the majority opinion does not address the second
question in much detail at all. Furthermore, the majority position would
have been more persuasive had the majority recited the jurisprudential
history of the statute to reveal that protection against the bankruptcy
of the insured" is no longer the only reason for the existence of the
right of direct action. Rather, it would appear that we in Louisiana
have simply chosen a direct method of dealing with the allocation of
loss and have recognized the pervasive reach of insurance into risks that
are not casualty-related and do not implicate the insolvency of the
insured.
Again, the dissent offers some interesting food for thought. Noting
that "a duty to defend is the hallmark of a liability policy,''25 the
dissenters focus on (1) the absence of any clear defense obligation and
(2) the inclusion of defense costs in the policy limits rather than paying
them beyond the limits as indications that the policy in question could
not be a liability policy. Since a current trend is to include defense costs
in the policy limits, thereby merging the defense and indemnity obli-
gations in the policy and offering the insured less total coverage for
the same premium, 26 it is possible that the Direct Action Statute might
23. See generally W. McKenzie & H. Johnson, Louisiana Insurance Law and Practice
§ 26, in 15 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1986) (the "no-action" clause and the "late
notice" clause).
24. A factor cited by the dissenters and thought unlikely to be present with a bank
as an insured, which is itself a doubtful premise.
25. 558 So. 2d at 230.
26. The professional malpractice policy offered by Home Insurance Company to
Louisiana lawyers at the time this is written, unlike the predecessor policy issued by New
England Insurance Company, is a policy which includes defense expenses in the policy
limits. This raises a variety of interesting questions, not the least of which is whether the
need of the insured for personal counsel is enhanced to assure that the company wisely
spends its defense dollar to protect the insured to the greatest extent possible. If the
defense expenses are not carefully husbanded, the insured could find himself on the eve
of trial with no indemnity coverage whatsoever and yet no clear way out of the ongoing
litigation.
1990]
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soon be amended, either to codify or to overrule the result in Quinlan.
If, however, the dissent is considered correct and the Direct Action
Statute is not amended, the reach of that provision might be substantially
curtailed, thus radically changing the face of Louisiana insurance liti-
gation.
The other decision involving the Direct Action Statute raises long-
dormant issues of late notice of the claim. Most policies continue to
premise coverage of a claim on the full cooperation of the insured and
the early notice of a claim, thereby implying that coverage might be
denied if the insured is "late" in providing notice of the claim. What
"late" means is open to discussion, but in Louisiana courts, insurers
have rarely been successful in escaping their obligations. Courts usually
require that clear prejudice in defending the claim, a difficult burden
to discharge, be demonstrated by the insurer. 27 In very few cases has
sufficient prejudice been established. 2
The subject of late notice was also revisited during this term in
Lodrigue v. Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. .29 Plaintiff's wife and minor
son were involved in an automobile accident with defendant's insured.
Shortly thereafter, plaintiff presented to defendant a very small property
damage claim which was paid by the defendant. About eight months
later, plaintiff filed a city court suit against the insured for personal
injuries to his son and related medical expenses.
27. See Pomares v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 474 So. 2d 976 (La. App. 5th
Cir.), writ denied, 447 So. 2d 1131 (1985) (first notice of accident when service of
garnishment petition occurred more than six years after the accident and more than one
year after judgment against insured; no prejudice shown; insured had been represented
by counsel in tort suit, but lost); Chennault v. Dupree, 398 So. 2d 169 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1981) (no prejudice established when there was no notice until insurer was named
in amended petition five years after accident); Miller v. Marcantel, 221 So. 2d 557 (La.
App. 3d Cii. 1969) (five-month delay in notice of filing of suit; suit was still pending
and insurer had received actual notice of accident and investigated it); Reid v. Monticello,
44 So. 2d 509 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1950) (no prejudice when insured discovered for first
time seven months after the incident that he might have coverage and promptly notified
the insurer).
28. MGIC Indemn. v. Central Bank of Monroe, 838 F. 2d 1382 (5th Cir. 1988)
(failure of insured to give insurer notice until appeal was pending was violation of insured's
obligation to give timely notice); Hallman v. Marquette Cas. Co., 149 So. 2d 131 (La.
App. 2d Cir. 1963) (omnibus insured in accident; named insured informed insurer; claim
brought only against former, and insurer had no notice of it; default judgment taken
and never paid; suit then brought against insurer, which successfully defended on ground
of late notice, upon showing that it could no longer defend on the merits). See also
Elevating Boats, Inc. v. Gulf Coast Marine, Inc., 766 F. 2d 195 (5th Cir. 1985). See
generally W. McKenzie & H. Johnson, Louisiana Insurance Law and Practice § 26, in
15 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1986).
29. 560 So. 2d 848 (La. App. 3d Cir.), rev'd, 565 So. 2d 426, reh'g denied, 566
So. 2d 384 (1990).
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A default judgment against the insured was taken and confirmed
about five months after the suit was filed, and within a month after
that, plaintiff's counsel asked the insurer to pay the judgment. When
the insurer declined, plaintiff filed suit against the insurer, not to make
the judgment "executory" but to litigate liability and quantum anew.
The insurer first filed exceptions of prescription and res judicata which
were overruled. The insurer then filed a motion for summary judgment
on the basis of late notice which was granted. The appellate court
affirmed.
In an attempt to cure the notice problem, plaintiff argued that the
payment of the property damage claim was sufficient notice to the
insurer of a potential personal injury claim, but this contention was
properly rejected. The plaintiff then provided the affidavit of the in-
sured's mother, who averred that she had given the insurer notice of
the incident. The affidavit was rather general and both courts found it
insufficient to establish a material issue of fact as to notice. Finding
that the case was one of no notice prior to a default judgment being
taken, the appellate court held that prejudice to the insurer resulted as
a matter of law when the first notice came after the default judgment.
This statement, while arguably a sound proposition, is contained in only
one other Louisiana case.3 0
If left standing, Lodrigue might have signalled a trend away from
the narrow interpretation of the late notice clause in policies and might
have afforded insurers some measure of relief from defense and indem-
nity obligations in the exceptional case in which late notice has created
problems in defending the claim. But the supreme court granted a writ
and reversed the summary judgment in a per curiam opinion, on the
basis that the mother's affidavit created a genuine issue of material fact
appropriate for resolution at trial.3 This disposition of course permitted
the court to pretermit, at least for the moment, an evaluation of the
appellate court's treatment of the late notice issue. Apparently, a full
discussion of the late notice issue by the supreme court will have to
await another day.
HEALTH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCE
On the legislative front, health and accident insurance was one of
the hottest topics in the 1990 Regular Session of the Louisiana Legis-
lature. Most of the enactments concern business practices of insurers in
this field, but insurance counsel should be aware of these changes as
well.
30. Hallman v. Marquette Cas. Co., 149 So. 2d 131 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1963).
31. 565 So. 2d 426 (La. 1990).
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Act 53832 requires a group health and accident carrier to give forty-
five days notice of an increase in premiums of 20% or more, and sixty
days notice of cancellation or nonrenewal of the policy, except for non-
payment of premiums. In groups of a hundred persons or more, this
requirement may be waived by contract. Act 87233 expands the juris-
diction of courts competent to hear claims for penalties and attorney's
fees relative to health and accident insurance claims beyond the district
court in the parish of the domicile of the insured to include any court
of "competent" jurisdiction in the parish except justice of the peace
courts. Act 87934 provides a statutory definition of total disability for
purposes of disability policies. Finally, Act 6415 authorizes the Com-
missioner of Insurance to regulate any entity issuing health care coverage
unless the entity can show it is being regulated by another state or
federal agency; this should permit the Commissioner to regulate some
entities which do not take the form of traditional insurers and have
heretofore escaped regulation by the Department of Insurance or perhaps
by any other state or federal agency.
One decision of note occurred during this term in the health and
accident insurance field, involving the obligations of an insurer to pay
expenses for alcoholism, drug abuse and related mental disorders. In
Hargroder v. Protective Life Insurance Company,3 6 the insurer had
rejected most of the claimed expenses on behalf of the insured and two
of his children for alcohol and drug abuse treatment. The dispute
centered around the statutory requirement 7 that a health and accident
insurer offer coverage for these problems as an option to the policy-
holder. The evidence indicated that the policyholder was the insured's
employer-the local school board; that the insurer presented the school
superintendent, a school board employee, the option to include substance
abuse treatment coverage for a higher premium; and that the superin-
tendent, but not the board itself, rejected such coverage.
Plaintiff contended the statute required that the policyholder reject
the offered coverage. The plaintiff reasoned, therefore, that since the
superintendent was neither policyholder nor authorized agent of the
policyholder, the proffered coverage was never properly rejected and
was available to cover the disputed claims.
Both the trial court and the appellate court agreed with that con-
tention, albeit for slightly different reasons. The appellate court rejected
32. 1990 La. Acts No. 538. See also 1990 La. Acts Nos. 877 § I and 886 § 1, which
provide for the same general subject matter.
33. 1990 La. Acts No. 872 § 1.
34. 1990 La. Acts No. 879 § 1.
35. 1990 La. Acts No. 641 § I.
36. 556 So. 2d 991 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 559 So. 2d 1637 (1990).
37. La. R.S. 22:215.5 (Supp. 1990).
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the notion that the policy afforded coverage for substance abuse treat-
ment costs unless specifically rejected by the policyholder. Rather, the
court analogized this case to those arising under the provisions governing
uninsured motorist coverage, concluding that public policy requires that
rejection of substance abuse expense coverage must be made in "ab-
solutely proper form."" In the absence of such "form"-a term not
statutorily specified beyond that the rejection must be made by the
policyholder- 9the offered coverage will be deemed to have been ac-
cepted. The net result of Hargroder is an extension of the rationale
espoused in Rudloff v. Louisiana Health Services & Indemnity Com-
pany,4' where the court deemed that the statutorily-required coverage
existed although the carrier had never made the offer and thus the
carrier could not have either accepted or rejected.
Borrowing the rationale utilized in the context of uninsured motorist
coverage and applying that reasoning to the area of substance abuse
coverage under a health and accident policy is an interesting judicial
technique. This approach, however, lacks jurisprudential support and
attorneys should be cognizant of its use in future cases.
38. 556 So. 2d at 997.
39. La. R.S. 22:1406(D)(1) (1978) contains rather elaborate provisions on the proper
form, fleshed out in great detail by the cases.
40. 385 So. 2d 767 (La. 1979).
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